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SECONDARY RECOVERY OPERATIONS AND THE RULE OF CAPTURE
Young v. Ethyl Corp., 521 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1975)
Plaintiff owned 180 acres of Arkansas farmland' surrounded by land
in which defendants held mineral and salt-water leases.2 By the use of
1. The land involved in the recovery operation is known as the "Kerlin Brine
Field" and overlies the Smackover Lime Formation. Salt water brine is extracted from
the formation at a depth of 8200 feet. Young v. Ethyl Corp., 382 F. Supp. 769, 772
(W.D. Ark. 1974), rev'd, 521 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1975).
2. Plaintiff owned 180 acres of land in fee which were surrounded by 16,000 acres
owned or leased by defendants who were engaged in a bromine extraction operation.
During the mining operation, salt water bearing bromine was displaced from beneath
plaintiff's land and extracted through defendants' wells. 382 F. Supp. at 771.
Before commencing extraction, defendants had unsuccessfully attempted to acquire
plaintiff's mineral and salt water rights. Defendants offered plaintiff $25 per acre and,
in addition, $10 per acre per year. Other owners in the 16,000 acre block comprising
the area of operation had accepted similar terms. Id.
Because plaintiff owned in fee the land from which the minerals were drained, as op-
posed to owning only the gas and oil rights, he had a vested interest in nonsolid miner-
als underlying the property. Middleton v. Western Coal and Mining Co., 241 F. Supp.
407, 415 (W.D. Ark. 1965), aff'd, 362 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1966); Skelly Oil Co. v. John-
son, 209 Ark. 1107, 1119, 194 S.W.2d 425, 431 (1946); Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Goode,
160 Ark. 48, 61, 254 S.W. 345, 349 (1923); Osborn v. Arkansas Territorial Oil & Gas
Co., 103 Ark. 175, 179-80, 146 S.W. 122, 124 (1912). A mineral lease merely grants
the lessee an inchoate right to drill for such minerals; title does not vest until the min-
erals are recovered. In both Budd v. Ethyl Corp., 251 Ark. 639, 642, 474 S.W.2d 411,
413 (1971), and Young v. Ethyl Corp., 521 F.2d 771, 773 n.3 (8th Cir. 1975), the
courts quoted with approval Osborn v. Arkansas Territorial Oil & Gas Co., 103 Ark.
175, 180, 146 S.W. 122, 124 (1912):
A gas lease, such as is involved in this case, is a contract granting to the
lessee the right to explore the land and to produce therefrom the gas therein
discovered. It is not a present sale or transfer of title to the gas, but, on ac-
count of its vagrant nature, the gas does not become actually owned until ac-
tually possessed. As is said in the case of Williamson v. Jones, 39 NV. Va.
231 [19 S.E. 436 (1894)J: 'The title is dependent on finding the gas by the
purchaser in a limited time,' and is inchoate.
In Budd, the plaintiff held a mineral lease for land being drained by a nearby salt water
mining operation. The court stressed that the plaintiff's interest in the minerals was
inchoate and found no trespass against a vested property right. Budd v. Etlyl Corp.,
251 Ark. 639, 642, 474 S.W.2d 411, 413 (1971). For a further explanation of Budd,
see note 25 infra.
In both Budd and Young, plaintiffs contended that the defendants committed an ac-
tionable trespass by forcing a foreign substance, debrominated water, into the ground
and through the subsurface of plaintiffs' land. Budd v. Ethyl Corp., 251 Ark. 639, 642-
43, 474 S.W.2d 411, 413 (1971); Brief for Appellant at 25, Young v. Ethyl Corp., 521
F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1975). The debrominated water forced valuable brine from beneath
plaintiff's land and into defendants' wells. This underground movement of fluid across
property lines was the basis for both claims of trespass. Young v. Ethyl Corp., 382 F.
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wells surrounding plaintiff's property, defendants injected debrominated
salt water s into the ground to force valuable brine4 beneath plaintiff's
Supp. 769, 772 (W.D. Ark. 1974); Budd v. Ethyl Corp., 251 Ark. 639, 639, 474 S.W.2d
411,412 (1971).
Three major theories--ownership-in-place, nonownership, and qualified ownership-
have been developed to protect a landowner's interest in nonsolid minerals located
beneath his land. 1 H. WiLLuAMs & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 203.1-203.3 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS & MEYERS]. Arkansas adheres to the ownership-in-place
theory; see Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Goode, supra at 61, 254 S.W. at 349 (owner of land
holds vested property right in all oil, gas, and other nonsolid minerals located beneath
surface of land). A property owner's interest in these minerals is the same as one in
solid minerals, but continues only while the nonsolid minerals are in place beneath the
property. The landowner is divested of title should such minerals migrate from beneath
his land and be "captured" through a well on another's property. "The rule of capture
appears equally applicable in all states, whatever the basic theory adopted as to the na-
ture of the landowner's interest." 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS § 204.4, at 50. The plaintiff
in Young claimed that title could be divested only when the migration was natural, not
forced. Brief for Appellant at 14, Young v. Ethyl Corp., 521 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1975).
The nonownership theory means that ownership of oil, gas, or other nonsolid minerals
does not vest until they are extracted from the ground. This theory assumes that oil
and gas are fugacious. See note 13 infra. Early in the development of this theory,
courts analogized oil and gas law to the law of wild animals, ferae naturae. Ownership
of ferae naturae, like ownership of oil and gas, does not attach until the animal is reduced
to possession. I WILLIAMS & MEYERS § 203.1.
The third theory, qualified ownership, initially differed from nonownership in only
one respect. In qualified ownership jurisdictions an oil or gas producer had "correlative
duties" not to waste oil or gas or damage the formation, and thus reduce the total recov-
ery from a common pool. Nonownership jurisdictions have recently developed the
same "correlative duties" so that the two theories are now essentially the same. Id. at
§ 203.2.
3. Primary production of nonsolid minerals relies on the "natural pressure of the
field" to force the mineral through the well bore. The natural pressure that causes the
substance to move toward the well decreases as large quantities of the mineral are re-
moved from the reservoir. Eventually, the natural pressure drops so low that continued
primary production becomes impossible. While the cost of primary production is low
compared to other production methods, only a small percentage of the mineral in place
can be recovered. If the reservoir retains enough mineral to justify increased costs,
producers institute secondary production measures. Driscoll, Secondary Recovery of Oil
and Gas: The Significance of Agency Approval, 13 U. KAN. L Rnv. 481, 481 (1965).
Secondary recovery operations have enabled the oil and gas industry to increase
dramatically recovery from a reservoir. The term "secondary recovery" encompasses a
variety of techniques in which a foreign substance, often salt water or depleted natural
gas, is injected into the reservoir to force the more valuable minerals to move toward
a production well. Id. Secondary recovery describes situations in which injection
commences after the reservoir has reached the limit of primary production. When
injection begins before the reservoir reaches that limit, the technique is termed
"pressure maintenance." While pressure maintenance is often referred to as a secondary
recovery method, this is technically incorrect. Roark, Advancing Technology and the
Relationship Between the Lawyer and the Engineer, 19TH ANN. INST. ON OIL AND GAS
LAW AND TAXAT1ON 143, 147 (1968).
4. The defendants extracted through their production wells salt water brine con-
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land toward defendants' production wells.; Plaintiff sought an in-
junction,6 and damages or an accounting 7 for defendants' subsurface
trespass and conversion. The federal district court" applied the
rule of capture9 and dismissed the action.10 The United States Court of
taining the mineral bromine. The water was piped to a nearby chemical plant where
the bromine was removed. The waste salt water was then returned to the field and in.
jected into the reservoir as the pressurizing substance. The process of extracting the
valuable brine from the field, removing the bromine, and returning the waste water to
the field to maintain pressure is known as a "recycling operation." Young v. Ethyl
Corp., 382 F. Supp. 769, 771-72 (W.D. Ark. 1974), rev'd, 521 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1975).
The district court described bromine as a "deep red, caustic liquid emitting an irritat-
ing, reddish-brown, ill-smelling vapor used, inter alia, for manufacture of ethylene dibro-
mide, a gasoline additive chemical." Id. at 771 n.1.
5. Secondary recovery involves two sets of wells, one set to inject the pressure-caus-
ing substance and another set to produce the mineral. In Young, plaintiff's land was
located near the southwest corner of defendants' parcel. Defendants operated ten input
wells on the perimeter of their property. Input well number 13 was immediately south
of plaintiff's property; production wells number 18 and number 23 were located just
north of plaintiffs' property. Id. at 772. The district court noted:
It is established, and undisputed, that the injection of debrominated waters
from the defendants' plant through well numbered 13, under high pressure, dis-
places the brine waters in the formation underlying the plaintiff's lands, forc-
ing it to move toward, and eventually produce through wells numbered 18 and
23.
Id.
6. The injunction was sought against the continued operation of the chemical
plant. Id. at 770.
7. Plaintiff also sought an accounting of the gross proceeds of defendants' plant
or, alternatively, the gross sales of all products. The purpose of the accounting was to
claim a proportionate share of the products or sales "therefrom taken from his lands
as bears to the whole of the products going into the plant." Id. In addition, plaintiff
wanted to establish, and recover for, damages to his property caused by the recycling
operation and operation of the plant. Id. Plaintiff's theory of recovery was trespass.
Id. See note 46 infra and accompanying text.
8. Federal jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1970). 382 F. Supp. at 771. Defendant Ethyl Corporation is a Virginia corporation;
defendant Great Lakes Chemical Corporation is a Michigan corporation; defendant Cal-
vert Exploration Company is a Delaware corporation; and defendant Bromet Company
is a limited partnership with Ethyl Corporation as the sole general partner and Great
Lakes Chemical Corporation as the sole limited partner. Bromet Company became a
limited partnership under the laws of Virginia. Id. at 771-72. Plaintiff, a citizen of
Arkansas, alleged damages of $9,000,000. Id. at 772.
9. The rule of capture has been phrased:
The owner of a tract of land acquires title to the oil and gas which he produces
from wells drilled thereon, though it may be proved that part of such oil and
gas migrated from adjoining lands.
1 WmLIMS & MYEPs § 204.4, at 50. See note 12 infra.
10. Young v. Ethyl Corp., 382 F. Supp. 769, 774 (W.D. Ark. 1974), rev'd, 521 F.2d
771 (8th Cir. 1975).
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Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, found an actionable trespass,
and held: The rule of capture does not apply to the forced migration of
nonfugacious minerals."
The rule of capture provides that the operator of a well gains title to
all minerals extracted through that well regardless of their place of
origin.1" In the early 1900's, scientists were unable to measure subter-
11. Young v. Ethyl Corp., 521 F.2d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 1975).
12. In Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. Dewitt, 130 Pa. 235, 18 A.
724 (1889), the court stated:
Water and oil, and still more strongly gas, may be classed by themselves,
if the analogy be not too fanciful, as minerals ferae naturae. In common with
animals, and unlike other minerals, they have the power and the tendency to
escape without the volition of the owner. Their 'fugitive and wandering ex-
istence within the limits of a particular tract was uncertain,' as said by Chief
Justice Agnew in Brown v. Vandergrift, 80 Pa. 147, 148. They belong to the
owner of the land, and are part of it, so long as they are on or in it, and are
subject to his control; but when they escape, and go into other land, or come
under another's control, the title of the former owner is gone. Possession of
the land, therefore, is not necessarily possession of the gas. If an adjoining,
or even distant, owner, drills his own land, and taps your gas, so that it comes
into his well and under his control, it is no longer yours, but his.
Id. at 249-50, 18 A. at 725.
The landowner's remedy for this problem was later said to be "go and do likewise."
Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, 365, 65 A. 801, 802 (1907).
In Barnard, quoted in Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and Its Implications as Applied
to Oil and Gas, 13 TEXAS L. REv. 391, 397 (1935), the court stated:
'An oil or gas well may draw its product from an indefinite distance and
in time exhaust a large space. Exact knowledge on this subject is not at pres-
ent attainable, but the vagrant character of the mineral and the porous sand
rock in which it is found and through which it moves, fully justify the general
conclusion we have stated above and have led to its general adoption by practi-
cal operators.' (quoting Wettengel v. Gormley, 160 Pa. 559, 567, 28 A. 934,
935 (1894)].
'The right of every landowner to drill a well on his own land at whatever
spot he may see fit' certainly must be conceded. If, then, the landowner drills
on his own land at such a spot as best subserves his purposes what is the stand-
ing of the adjoining landowner whose oil or gas may be drained by this well?
He certainly ought not to be allowed to stop his neighbor from developing his
own farm. There is no certain way of ascertaining how much of the oil and
gas that comes out of the well was when in situ under this farm and how much
under that. What then has been held to be the law?-it is this, as we under-
stand it, every landowner or his lessee may locate his wells wherever he
pleases, regardless of the interests of others. He may distribute them over the
whole farm or locate them only on one part of it. He may crowd the adjoining
farms so as to enable him to draw the oil and gas from them. What then can
the neighbor do? Nothing, only go and do likewise. He must protect his own
oil and gas. He knows it is wild and will run away if it finds an opening and
it is his business to keep it at home. This may not be the best rule, but nei-
ther the legislature nor our highest court has given us any better. No doubt
many thousands of dollars have been expended 'in protecting lines' in oil and
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ranean oil and gas deposits and therefore assumed that these substances
were fugacious, 13 that is, apt to wander. To settle title disputes, courts
adopted the rule of capture as an easy and practical solution. 14 Recent-
ly, an improved understanding of the characteristics of oil and gas
deposits, combined with an improved ability to control underground
drainage, 15 have undermined the original basis for the rule."0 Yet, the
gas territory that would not have been expended if some rule had existed by
which it could have been avoided. Injunction certainly is not the remedy.
Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., supra at 365, 65 A. at 802 (emphasis
added). See generally 1 W. SuMMms, THE LAw OF OIL & GAS § 61 (1954) [hereinafter
cited as SUMMERS]; 1 WiLLAMS & MEYmns § 204.4; Hardwicke & Woodward, Fair
Share and the Small Tract in Texas, 41 TExAs L. Rnv. 75 (1962).
13. 'The Oxford English Dictionary defines fugacious as meaning 'apt to flee away
or flit' and fugacity as meaning 'volatile'." Young v. Ethyl Corp., 521 F.2d 771, 774
n.7, quoting IV THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DiCtONARY 584 (1971).
14. See, e.g., Acme Oil & Mining Co. v. Williams, 140 Cal. 681, 74 P. 296
(1903); People's Gas Co. v. Tyner, 131 Ind. 277, 31 N.E. 59 (1892); Louisville Gas
Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 117 Ky. 71, 77 S.W. 368 (1903); Higgins Oil & Fuel
Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206 (1919); Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co., 57
Ohio St. 317, 49 N.E. 399 (1897); Barnard v. Monongehela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa.
362, 65 A. 801 (1907), quoted in note 12 supra; Wettengel v. Gormley, 160 Pa. 559, 28
A. 934 (1894), cited in note 12 supra; Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v.
Dewitt, 130 Pa. 235, 18 A. 724 (1889), quoted in note 12 supra. For a more complete
list of early rule of capture cases, see Hardwicke, supra note 12, at 404 n.17.
15. Since 1960, mining technology in the oil and gas industry has undergone a rev-
olution. Many new processes have reached the stage of economic and technological
practicality and are beginning to receive wide acceptance within the industry. Among
the newer methods are miscible displacement, chemical additives, fracturing, and thermal
processes. The oldest secondary recovery method, and the one most commonly in use
today, is waterflooding. See Roark, supra note 3, at 143-44.
In its least sophisticated form the waterflooding technique merely involves the injec-
tion of salt water into a reservoir of oil. The oil is displaced by the salt water and
moves toward the production wells. The placement of input and production wells is cru-
cial to the success of the project. As a result of the dependability of waterflooding, sci-
entists are investigating the possibility of increasing the displacement efficiency of salt
water. Dow Chemical Company and Union Oil Company have developed a "pusher"
chemical which has been successful in displacing low gravity oils. Other additives are
being considered. Id. at 155.
Miscible displacement involves the creation of a bank of fluid between the oil and
the displacing agent. The fluid bank is totally soluble in the oil ahead of it and the
displacing agent behind it. Natural gas is the most widely used displacement agent. In
the few regions in which this technique has been put to practical, as opposed to experi-
mental, use the recovery of oil is almost 100 percent. The uncertainties and the cost
of this new method have so far discouraged its extensive use. Id. at 155-56.
Heavy oils become more mobile under heat. The existence of large reserves of heavy
oils has led to the development of techniques that deliver heat to the reservoir. In one
technique, steam is injected into the reservoir. After injection the reservoir is quickly
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rule survives in virtually all jurisdictions."7
The impact of the rule of capture has been softened by the develop-
ment of the common law doctrine of "correlative rights"18 which pro-
returned to production. The feasibility of thermal processes is still in doubt; cost is high
and success unproven. Id. at 156.
Fracturing is the technique of opening new fissures in the reservoir rock and widening
those that already exist. Providing larger openings for the oil or gas means less pres-
sure is needed to produce more mineral. The materials that create the fissures are called
propping agents. Fluids carrying these agents, often graded sand or glass beads, are
ptmped into the reservoir under high pressure. This procedure has become a widespread
and successful method of increasing production. Tests are now being conducted in the
me of controlled underground nuclear explosions as a fracturing technique. Id. at 159.
For more technical discussions of oil and gas engineering, see G. CIILNGER, G.
LANGNES & J. ROBERTSON, JR., SECONDARY RECOVERY AND CARBONATE RESERVOIRS
(1972); 0. SPENCER, SECONDARY RECOVERY OF OiL (1949); Beecher & Fowler, Produc-
tion Techniques and Control, in HISTORY OF PETROLEUM ENGINEERING 745 (1961);
de Witte, Formation Evaluation, in OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION FROM CARBONATE ROCKS
117 (1972); Lewis, Fluid Injection, in HISTORY OF PETROLEUM ENGINEERING 847 (1961).
16. See Hardwicke, supra note 12, at 398; StUMMERS § 63; 1 WILLIAMs & MEYERS
§ 203-05.
17. For a list of cases affirming the rule of capture, see 1 SUMMERS § 63, at 181-
82 nn. 44 & 44.1; 1 WI.IiAmS & MEYERS § 204.4, at 51-52 nn. 3-6; Kuntz, Correlative
Rights in Oil and Gas, 30 Miss. L.J. 1 n.1 (1958).
18. "Correlative rights" is a doctrine that insures adjacent landowners an equal op-
portunity to recover a fair share of minerals from a common reservoir. See, e.g., Ohio
Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900); Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co.,
117 Ky. 71. 77 S.W. 368 (1903). Although the rule of capture allows an individual
to extract minerals from a common source of supply without accounting to his neighbors
for any of the production, the "doctrine of correlative rights" prevents him from com-
pletely disregarding the interests of those neighbors. Extraction of oil or gas from a
common pool inevitably affects all local landowners: as more of a product is recovered
by one producer, less can be recovered by others. With the increase in oil and gas
production, courts began to temper the rule of capture by applying the "doctrine of cor-
relative rights." Kuntz, supra note 17, at 1-2. See also Higgins Oil & Gas Co. v. Guar-
anty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206 (1919); Hague v. Wheeler, 157 Pa. 324, 27 A.
714 (1893); Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558 (1948).
The rule of capture led to situations in which operators raced to maximize their own
recovery of gas and oil before other producers depleted the reservoir. These operators
were unconcerned with increasing the total amount that could be extracted from the
common reservoir. Kuntz, supra note 17, at 2. Thus, the initial limitations under the
doctrine of correlative rights were designed to prevent wanton abuse of the common
pool rather than to ensure that adjacent owners recovered a proportionate share of the
minerals.
Three elements of the early case law on correlative rights can be discerned: the right
against wastage and spoilage of minerals extracted from the pool; the right against mali-
cous depletion; and, the right to a fair opportunity to extract gas and oil from a common
pool. Id. at 1-2. The prohibitions against waste and spoilage are a judicial recognition
of the public interest in conserving valuable energy supplies. Id. at 4-5. Waste and
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hibits drilling activities that may cause excessive drainage from adjacent
land. Many state legislatures have codified the doctrine' and have
empowered state agencies to oversee drilling operations. 20  Under cer-
tain circumstances the agencies may abrogate the rule of capture by
requiring that a reservoir of oil or gas be exploited by a single unit
formed from adjacent land holdings.21 Landholders included in the unit
spoilage abuses include damage to the land structure from use of inferior casing, incom-
petent employees, see, e.g., McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 184 La. 101, 165 So.
636 (1936), or negligent failure to plug an abandoned well, see, e.g., Hague v. Wheeler,
157 Pa. 324, 27 A. 714 (1893).
The right to a fair opportunity to extract oil and gas from a common pool does not
mean that production must be divided among all interest holders according to either
their share of the entire field or the amount of drainage from their tract. Absent statu-
tory provisions for mandatory or voluntary pooling, this doctrine does not abrogate the
rule of capture. It merely accords adjacent owners and lessees the co-equal right to
produce from the pool when they can do so through their own efforts. Kuntz, supra
note 17, at 4-5. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209 (1900) ("[Clo-equal
right to take from common source of supply . . ."). Fair opportunity amounts to a
doctrine of fair competition. All parties must adhere to drilling regulations and must
take due care not to damage nearby operations through negligence. See Manufacturers'
Gas & Oil Co. v. The Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co., 155 Ind. 461, 57 N.E. 912 (1900)
(statute to prevent waste within police power of state); Kingwood Oil Co. v. Corpora-
tion Comm'n, 396 P.2d 1008 (Okla. 1964) (correlative rights amount to duty of owner
not to injure source of supply nor take undue proportion); Patterson v. Stanolind Oil &
Gas Co., 182 Okla. 155, 77 P.2d 83 (1938) (limitations on well spacing within police
power of state). The fair opportunity doctrine increasingly has become the subject of
legislation. State conservation statutes prohibiting waste often include within the defini-
tion of waste abuse of the fair opportunity doctrine. See note 19 infra.
19. Ar. STAT. ANN. § 53-110 (1971 repl. vol.) provides: "Waste of oil or gas as
defined in this act. . . is hereby prohibited." Section 53-109(I) provides:
'Waste' in addition to its ordinary meaning, shall mean 'physical waste' as
that term is generally understood in the oil and gas industry. It shall include:
Abuse of the correlative rights and opportunities of each owner of oil or gas
in a common reservoir due to nonuniform, disproportionate, and unratable
withdrawal causing undue drainage between tracts of land.
Many other states have enacted oil and gas conservation statutes defining "waste" in
similar language. See, e.g., ALA. CODn tit. 26, § 179(25)(I)(3) (1958); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 377.19(10)(K) (1974); GA. CoDn ANN. § 43-702(1)(3) (1974); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 113-389(14)(c) (1975), cited in 1 SUMMERS § 71, at 198 n.5.2. A complete
list of oil and gas conservation statutes may be found in 5 SUMMERS H§ 1000-51.
20. See 1 SUMMERs § 71, at 198-99 n.5.3.
21. Efficiency often requires adjacent landowners to work as a single unit to exploit
a reservoir of oil or gas, especially when using secondary recovery operations. Geolo-
gists determine the optimum placement of wells within the unitized area, so that many
members of a unit will not have a production well placed on their property. The rule
of capture, by awarding title to the oil to the owner of the land on which it is produced,
would be unjust in both voluntary and compulsory unitization arrangements. In volun-
Washington University Open Scholarship
Vol. 1976:148] SECONDARY RECOVERY OPERATIONS 155
receive a prorata share of the profits. State regulations, however, do not
cover all minerals in which drainage and abuse of correlative rights can
occur.
22
In Young v. Ethyl Corp.,23 the Eighth Circuit, applying Arkansas
law, distinguished Budd v. Ethyl Corp.24 in which a similarly situated
plaintifft 5 had been denied relief in the state courts. The Young court
tary arrangements the rule is discarded by agreement; while in compulsory unitization
state regulations abrogate the rule and require that each member receive a proportionate
share of the proceeds. Bowen, Secondary Recovery Operations-Their Value and Legal
Problems, 13th ANN. INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXA11ON 331, 369-70 (1962).
While unitization originally occurred on a voluntary basis, a single obstreperous owner
can block the entire arrangement. Recognizing the difficulty in securing voluntary uniti-
zation and the need for efficient oil and gas recovery, many states have passed manda-
tory unitization statutes empowering state agencies to require unitization upon request
of a specified percentage of land owners. Oklahoma enacted the first such statute in
1945. Id. at 363. See id. at 363 n.68, citing ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 179(71) (Cum. Supp.
1973); ALASKA STAT. § 31.05.110 (1962); AyK. STAT. ANN. § 53-115 (Cum. Supp.
1975); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 3315-3347 (Deering 1963); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 377.28
(Supp. 1975); IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-4-7-14 (Burns 1973); LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN.
§ 30.5 (West 1975); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 13.139(13) (1975); NEV. RFv. STAT. § 522.-
070 (1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 286.1 (1969); ORE. REV. STAT. § 520.220
(1973); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 45-9-38 (1967).
22. The secondary recovery of salt water brine is a clear example of a mineral in
which abuse of correlative rights is not prevented by state conservation regulations.
The Arkansas Oil and Gas Board has no authority to require unitization of salt water
recovery operations or regulate the techniques used, secondary or otherwise. Budd v.
Ethyl Corp., 251 Ark. 639, 641, 474 S.W.2d 411, 413 (1971). For a discussion of corre-
lative rights, see note 18 supra.
23. 521 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1975).
24. 251 Ark. 639, 474 S.W.2d 411 (1971).
25. In Budd, the plaintiff owned interests in two tracts of land. One tract was out-
side but adjacent to the defendants' recycling area. Budd claimed that defendants' op-
eration caused valuable brine to flow from beneath his property towards defendants'
production wells. Budd owned an undivided one thirty-sixth interest in the subsurface
minerals. Id. at 640, 474 S.W.2d at 412. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the
rule of capture applied to the drainage of salt water brine from this piece of property
towards defendants' wells. Id. at 640-41,474 S.W.2d at 412-13.
The other piece of property in which Budd had an interest lay within the perimeter
of the recycling operation. The Young court faced an identical situation except that
Budd held merely an undivided one-tenth leasehold interest in the oil, gas, and mineral
rights; the defendant held the remaining nine-tenths undivided leasehold interest and the
fee. Instead of applying the rule of capture to the drainage from Budd's inside tract,
the court decided the case on the limited character of plaintiff's leasehold interest. Id.
at 641, 474 S.W.2d at 413. Since Budd had no possessory or vested interest in the unre-
covered minerals beneath that tract, no trespass could occur. See note 2 supra. Al-
though plaintiff was denied relief in both situations, the court did not apply the rule
of capture to Budd's claim regarding the inside tract. Id. at 641-42, 474 S.W.2d at 413.
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noted that plaintiff owned the land within the recycling area in fee and
therefore had a vested right in the property and subsurface minerals;"
Budd had "owned only an 'inchoate' interest in the 40-acre tract."'27
Because the Arkansas Supreme Court had decided Budd on the basis of
plaintiff's limited interest in the property28 rather than the rule of
capture, the Eighth Circuit was not obliged to follow the latter theory in
Young.
The Young court reviewed the original justification for the rule of
capture and noted that "the development of more sophisticated knowl-
edge" has led to criticism of "the absolutism with which some courts
continue to apply the rule of capture. ' 29 Recognizing that the Arkansas
Supreme Court had recently affirmed application of the rule to the
natural drainage of salt water,30 the court stated that "it would be
unwise to extend the rule to situations in which nonfugacious minerals
26. Arkansas adheres to the ownership-in-place theory of nonsolid minerals. See
note 2 supra. According to this theory, Young had title to the salt water brine beneath
his land. Young contended, and the Eighth Circuit agreed, that the rule of capture
would divest him of title only if the drainage were natural. 521 F.2d at 774.
27. 521 F.2d at 773; see note 25 supra.
28. "Although the [Budd] court could once again have relied on the law of capture,
it did not do so. Instead it denied relief because of Budd's limited interest in the prop-
erty." Young v. Ethyl Corp., 521 F.2d at 773 (footnote omitted). The footnote
omitted from the preceding quotation stated:
The dissenter spoke as if he thought that the majority was applying the law
of capture to the tract within the recycling unit .... We do not read the ma-
jority opinion to have done so.
Id. at 773 n.2.
While Young reached a proper result in terms of public policy, the court's attempt
to distinguish Budd is not wholly convincing. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that, while
fully aware of the rule of capture, the Arkansas Supreme Court elected to deny relief
for the inside tract on the basis of plaintiff's limited interest; thus, the court implicitly
held the rule of capture inapplicable to forced migration. The inference drawn from
this negative pregnant is valid only if plaintiff in Budd had not contended that the out-
side tract was subject to forced drainage caused by defendants' operations, a point on
which the Budd opinion is unclear. 251 Ark. at 641, 474 S.W.2d at 412. If plaintiff's
adjacent land were subject to forced drainage, Budd would stand for the proposition that
the rule of capture applies to both natural and forced drainage.
Moreover, Budd held that the leasehold interest created merely an inchoate right be-
cause "on account of its vagrant nature, the gas does not become actually owned until
actually possessed." 251 Ark. at 642, 474 S.W.2d at 413, quoting Osborn v. Arkansas
Territorial Oil & Gas Co., 103 Ark. 175, 146 S.W. 122 (1912). This rationale is identi-
cal to the theory underlying the rule of capture. See note 12 supra. One may therefore
question the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that Budd was not controlling.
29. 521 F.2d at 774, citing SUMMERs § 63.
30. 521 F.2d at 772-73. See note 25 supra.
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are forced from beneath a landowner's property,"31 a conclusion the
court thought consistent with Budd.3 2
After holding the rule of capture inapplicable, the court added the
dictum that, had the rule been invoked, defendants would still have been
liable for abuse of "correlative rights. ' 3  The court stated that it would
be unreasonable to apply one theory of oil and gas law, the rule of
capture, without applying its corollary, the doctrine of "correlative
rights. '3 4  Since the doctrine of "correlative rights" was not the theo-
retical basis for granting relief, the court did not discuss the ramifica-
tions of this theory in detail.
The strength of the Young opinion is its attempt to limit a common
law rule that is no longer consistent with scientific knowledge and
techniques.3 5 When the rule originated, operators could not control
31. 521 F.2d at 774.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 775. Writing for the court, Judge Heaney stated that for oil and gas,
the doctrine of "correlative rights" had been codified in ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-109 &
53-110 (1971 repl. vol.). Section 53-109 defines waste to include denying adjacent land-
owners the opportunity to recover a proportionate share of a common pool of oil or gas,
while § 53-110 makes waste an abuse of correlative rights. 521 F.2d at 775.
34. Rather, it has an important corollary in the doctrine of "correlative
rights." This doctrine allows owners of land to extract oil or gas from a com-
mon pool, but posits two duties which limit the right of a landowner to drain
oil and gas from beneath adjacent lands: (1) the duty to other owners not
to injure the source of supply; and (2) the duty not to take an undue propor-
tion of the oil and gas from the common pool. . . . If causing undue drainage
is an abuse of correlative rights, then a fortiori forcing static minerals under
one's neighbor's land to migrate amounts to an abuse of those rights.
521 F.2d at 774-75 (footnotes omitted).
35. Almost from its inception, the rule of capture has been under attack. The court
in Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, 365, 65 A. 801, 802 (1907),
one of the seminal cases developing the rule, stated:
This may not be the best rule, but neither the legislature nor our highest court
has given us any better. No doubt many thousands of dollars have been ex-
pended 'in protecting lines' in oil and gas territory that would not have been
expended if some rule had existed by which it could have been avoided.
At that time, technology could neither control the flow of subterranean fluids nor meas-
ure precisely the amount of fluid in place. By the 1930's, however, the underpinnings
of the rule were gone, so that in 1935 one commentator stated:
[E]xperts can estimate with approximate accuracy the oil and gas in place in
a pool, and the amount ultimately recoverable under any given producing con-
ditions. With a fair amount of data available, relative or comparative figures
of a reasonable degree of accuracy can likewise be given with respect to the
recoverable reserve of the various leases in the field. Experts can, beyond
question, determine the direction of migration of oil and gas, as well as the
order of magnitude, and, to a remarkable degree, they can control such migra-
tions.
Hardwicke, supra note 12, at 394 (footnote omitted).
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drainage, and courts could not ascertain its amount.80 The develop-
ment of more sophisticated technology and a greater understanding of
geology permit oil and gas legislation intended to curb the abuses that
would occur with unfettered application of the rule of capture.87  Regu-
latory agencies today would probably disapprove a secondary recovery
operation that would remove a substantial amount of oil or gas from
beneath an adjacent tract unless fair compensation were guaranteed to
the tract's owner.38
Arkansas has long adhered to the ownership-in-place theory for
nonsolid minerals, which vests landowners with title to oil and gas
beneath their land.3 9 Because of the public interest in recovery of these
natural resources, however, the Arkansas legislature requires landown-
ers, in some circumstances, to participate in the unit operation of an oil
or gas reservoir. 40  When mandatory unitization occurs, the Arkansas
36. Hardwicke, supra note 12, at 397.
37. See generally Franks, The Rights of Consenting and Nonconsenting Owners
Under Secoludary Recovery and Pressure Maintenance Operations, 16th ANN. INST. ON
OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 343 (1965); Hardwicke, supra note 12; Keeton &
Jones, Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry II, 39 TExAs L. RaV. 253 (1961);
Kelley, Trespass in Secondary Recovery, 17 Sw. L.J. 591 (1963); Kennedy, Tort Liabil-
ity in Waterflood Operations, 5 ALBERTA L. REv. 52 (1966); Kuntz, supra note 17;
Lynch, Liability for Secondary Recovery Operations, 22d ANN. INST. ON OIL AND GAS
LAw AND TAXATION 37 (1971); Methvin, Secondary Recovery Operations: Rights of the
Non-Joiner, 42 TExAs L. REV. 364 (1964); Comment, Secondary Recovery Operations-
Protection of Correlative Rights, 2 LAND & WATER REv. 129 (1967).
38. Several cases have dealt with the liability of secondary recovery operators who
received agency approval for production programs. The cases indicate that agency ap-
proval, coupled with an offer of fair participation to neighbors, insulates the operator
from liability to any neighbor who refuses to join. Under its police power, a state has
authority to promote efficient recovery of natural resources. Using police power as the
rationale, some courts have concluded that by refusing a fair offer, landowners are dam-
aged by their own inaction rather than the operation of the unit. See, e.g., Tide Water
Associated Oil Co. v. Stott, 159 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 817
(1947); Reed v. Texas Co., 22 Ill. App. 2d 131, 159 N.E.2d 641 (1959); California
Co. v. Britt, 247 Miss. 718, 154 So. 2d 144 (1963); Baumgartner v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
184 Neb. 384, 168 N.W.2d 510 (1969); Syverson v. North Dakota State Indus. Comm'n,
111 N.W.2d 128 (N.D. 1961); West Edmond Saltwater Disposal Ass'n v. Rosecrans, 204
Okla. 9, 226 P.2d 965 (1950), appeal dismissed, 340 U.S. 924 (1951). Contra, Tide-
water Oil Co. v. Jackson, 320 F.2d 157 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 942 (1963).
39. Budd v. Ethyl Corp., 251 Ark. 639, 474 S.W.2d 411 (1971); Bodcaw Lumber
Co. v. Goode, 160 Ark. 48, 254 S.W. 345 (1923). See note 2 supra.
40. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-115 A-l(b) (1971 repl. vol.) requires mandatory pooling
of oil and gas reservoirs when the commission determines that such an order will prevent
waste, protect correlative rights, and prevent the drilling of unnecessary wells. Section
53-115 C-2(a) of the Arkansas Statute requires that 75 percent of the owners of the
mineral rights within the proposed unit sign a petition seeking the unitization order.
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statute protects the individual interests of those compelled to join the
unit,41 but it does not extend to salt water mining.42 Absent any
41. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-115 A-l(b) to C-2(c) (1971 repl. vol.). Two kinds
of unitization orders may be issued by a state regulatory agency, "mandatory" or "per-
missive." I SUMMERS § 76, at 242-48; Bowen, supra note 21, at 334, 363-64. The man-
datory unitization order requires that all production on land within a certain area be
operated as a single unit. The agency determines whether unit operation will promote
the public welfare and will assure the proper amount of compensation to each member
of the unit. Both determinations may be challenged in court as being unreasonable or
outside the scope of the enabling statute. A state may authorize mandatory unitization
procedures so long as the enabling statute contains reasonable methods for compensating
those forced to join the unit. See Bowen, supra note 21, at 363-75. See also 6 WIL-
LIAMS & MEYERS U, 905-05.3.
Permissive unitization orders, however, are issued after a determination that the op-
eration of a proposed secondary recovery unit will promote the public welfare and not
abuse the correlative rights of adjacent owners. The permissive order does not give the
unit authority to confiscate property of adjacent landowners and should not be equated
with a mandatory unitization order. See Bowen, supra note 21, at 337-40.
A number of courts, see cases cited note 38 supra, have erred by holding that a "per-
missive" unitization order bars recovery to landowners whose property is adjacent to an
approved unit operation. In essence, these courts have transformed a permissive order
into a grant of authority to confiscate neighbors' property. For instance, in Tide Water
Associated Oil Co. v. Stott, 159 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 817
(1947), defendant's operation resulted in less valuable "dry" gas replacing "wet" gas
beneath plaintiff's land. The court reasoned that the damage was not the result of the
authorized operation, but was caused by plaintiff's failure to accept a reasonable offer
to join the approved permissive unit. Cf. Railroad Comm'n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560
(Tex. 1962).
Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson, 320 F.2d 157 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 942
(1963), properly interpreted a "permissive" unitization order. Plaintiff's subsurface was
flooded by defendant's operation, a foreseeable consequence. Defendant claimed that
agency approval of his secondary recovery operation shielded him from liability. In re-
sponse the court stated:
We must lay aside any question of liability growing out of a compulsory uniti-
zation project . ..wherein the relative rights of interested parties are deter-
mined and constitutionally protected. We are concerned with a unilateral op-
eration, under a permissive order of the Commission, which authorizes the
leaseholder to conduct water flood operations on his own lease, in a common
source of supply, subject to the duties, obligations and consequent liabilities
imposed by law.
Id. at 162. The court had earlier stated that "the fact that an act is lawfully undertaken
and lawfully done does not, ipso facto, relieve the actor of liability for the harmful con-
sequences of his act." Id. at 161-62. Although an agency may authorize a recovery
program, it cannot authorize confiscation without compensation. Id. at 163.
42. We do not agree with the appellant's insistence that the law of capture was
completely nullified by the statute which permits the Oil and Gas Commission
to bring about compulsory unitization in oil and gas fields. . . . EAlnd
furthermore, we find no authority in the Oil and Gas Commission to order the
unitization of salt-water operations that have no bearing upon the extraction
or conservation of oil or gas.
Budd v. Ethyl Corp., 251 Ark. 639, 641, 474 S.W.2d 411, 412-13 (1971).
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statutory remedy, the Eighth Circuit wisely held the defendants liable
under a common law theory rather than permitting them to extract brine
from beneath plaintiff's property without compensation.41
Although the court correctly rejected defendants' attempt to hide
behind an outdated shield, common law trespass was a poor theory on
which to base liability.4" Other courts confronting the issue of liability
for forced subsurface movement of fluid substances have not agreed on
a proper theory. 45 The theory upon which an action is based affects
43. Young v. Ethyl Corp., 521 F.2d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 1975).
44. The choice of trespass as the theory of liability for subsurface movement of
pressurizing substances across property lines seems obvious. If the law of trespass for
forced surface movement were applied to subsurface movement, intentional trespass
would certainly be the proper theory. See W. PROsSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 13 (4th ed. 1971). During secondary recovery operations, the movement of
salt water or other fluids across property lines is not only foreseeable but virtually inevi-
table. Lynch, supra note 37, at 64. See also Baumgartner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 184 Neb.
384, 388, 168 N.W.2d 510, 513 (1969) ("The introduction of water into an oil reservoir
causes oil and water to migrate across lease lines and it is impossible to restrict the ad-
vance of the water to the lease lines"). The certainty of the movement, however, is
precisely what makes trespass an unworkable theory. If courts were to apply a trespass
theory, the operator of every secondary unit would be subject to liability regardless of
actual damage. See Lynch, supra note 38, at 64. A number of courts have apparently
rejected the trespass theory. See, e.g., Greyhound Leasing & Financial Corp. v. Joiner
City Unit, 444 F.2d 439 (10th Cir. 1971); Reed v. Texas Co., 22 Ill. App. 2d 131, 159
N.E.2d 651 (1959); California Co. v. Britt, 247 Miss. 718, 154 So. 2d 144 (1963); Baum-
gartner v. Gulf Oil Corp., supra; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Hughes, 371 P.2d 81 (Okla. 1962);
Railroad Comm'n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962). Cf. Mowrer v. Ashland Oil
& Ref. Co., 518 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1975).
The decision to institute secondary recovery operations is always risky. Fixed costs
are high and rewards uncertain. Considering the risk involved and the almost certain
tort liability under a trespass theory, many operators would choose to forego operations
they otherwise would undertake. Not only does trespass liability dissuade the potential
organizer, it discourages those who would be asked to join the unit. The nonjoiner could
forego the risks and be certain to collect damages for trespass. Lynch, supra note 38,
at 64. See also Lawson, Recent Developments in Pooling and Unitization, 23d ANN.
INST. ON OiL AND GAS LAw AND TAXATION 145, 203-04 (1972). The courts should not
develop a theory of liability that unnecessarily burdens the method of recovery best
suited to social needs.
45. In addition to trespass several other theories have been suggested. Strict liabil-
ity, nuisance, and fault theories comprise the major proposals falling within traditional
tort concepts. At least one writer, see Comment, supra note 37, has suggested a novel
approach to liability for secondary recovery operations by recommending that abuse of
correlative rights become a distinct tort concept Id. at 141, 142. Only California has
settled the issue through the legislative process. See CAr. Pun. REs. CODE § 3320.5
(Deering 1961) (operators liable only for damages caused by negligence).
The rationale for strict liability is that a business venture should bear all normal ex-
penses of doing business. Since the movement of fluid across property lines during see-
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ondary operations is virtually inevitable, "the enterprise" should include in its estimated
costs the damage caused by the encroachment. Green, Hazardous Oil and Gas Opera-
tions: Tort Liability, 33 TExAs L. Rv. 574, 579-81, 584 (1955). Strict liability suffers
from the same problem of rigidity as trespass. See note 44 supra. If liability were ab-
solute, the threat of damage suits would become a tremendous burden on secondary re-
covery. "A money judgment for damages in any substantial amount could be the differ-
ence between profitability and loss in any given project." Bowen, supra note 21, at 350.
Under strict liability theory the operator may displace a certain amount of oil beneath
a neighbor's land, and be held liable for damages even though the displacement does
not reduce the neighbor's total recovery and the unit operation itself is in the public wel-
fare. See Lynch, supra note 37, at 65-66. Strict liability is apparently the rule in Okla-
homa. Greyhound Leasing & Financial Corp. v. Joiner City Unit, 444 F.2d 439 (10th
Cir. 1971) (damages recovered without any negligent act); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Hughes,
371 P.2d 81 (Okla. 1962) (private nuisance without negligence). For a discussion of
the Oklahoma strict liability standard, see Lawson, supra note 44, at 197-209. See also
Foster & Keeton, Liability Without Fault in Oklahoma, 3 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1950).
Private nuisance has also been advocated as a theory of liability. See Methvin, supra
note 37, at 373. A theory of private nuisance would differ from that of strict liability
because courts could consider a number of factors before assessing liability. For
example, the court would determine whether the unit had minimized the encroachment;
whether unit operations were in the public interest; and whether actual damage had
occurred. The unit's operation would be a nuisance if the producers failed to prevent
as much drainage as possible and reduced the neighbor's ability to recover a fair share
of the oil or gas in the common reservoir. Lynch, supra note 37, at 67-68.
Considering either a permissive or compulsory unitization order, Lynch claims that
this theory describes a result, not a theory of liability. With a unitization order a state
regulatory agency has already determined that the unit operation is in the public welfare
and that the correlative rights of adjoining owners have been protected. Therefore, lia-
bility for private nuisance should only attach when the operators of the unit have failed
to take all reasonable precautions to prevent undue drainage. Failure to take reasonable
precautions turns the theory into a fault or negligence standard. Id. at 67-68. If liabil-
ity were to attach after a unitization order when drainage occurs, without failure to take
reasonable precautions, a theory of private nuisance becomes one of strict liability and
works a heavy burden on the oil and gas industry. Id. at 67. See Mowrer v. Ashland
Oil & Ref. Co., 518 F.2d 659, 662 (7th Cir. 1975) ("The trial court correctly held that
the doctrine of nuisance was applicable. .. ").
The best theory on which to base liability is a negligence or fault theory. This con-
cept is supported by Bowen, supra note 21, at 359, and by Lynch, supra note 37, at 72-
73. Using a fault theory, courts would determine if actual damage had occurred;
whether it Nsas foreseeable; and whether the operator had taken reasonable precautions
to prevent undue drainage. This theory provides needed flexibility, while still affording
the nonjoiner protection from negligent or willful damage. A fault concept would limit
damages to instances when plaintiff's total recovery is reduced. "[O]nly the theory of
fault properly recognizes the physical nature and social utility of secondary recovery op-
erations." Lynch, supra note 37, at 72.
The fault concept also best balances the functions of the state conservation agency
and the court. Prior to commencing secondary recovery procedures, the agency deter-
mines whether the program is in the best interests of society, see, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 53-101 (1971 repl. vol.), and protects the correlative rights of adjoining tract owners.
If damage occurs, the court would then determine if the unit were operated negligently.
Courts would apply the same negligence concept to both primary and secondary activity.
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both liability and the measure of damages.40 The Young court merely
concluded that the actions of the defendants constituted an actionable
trespass without discussing the merits of trespass as the legal basis for
When a program is deemed to be in the public interest, it is desirable to base liability
on fault. Id. at 71-72.
One novel approach turns abuse of correlative rights into a theory rather than a result.
This approach considers whether the operator has taken the proper precautions to pre-
vent undue drainage between tracts. If the precautions were reasonable and the operator
did not intentionally abuse adjacent owners, then liability would not attach for any
drainage that occurred. This approach accepts the rule of capture but does not as-
sume landowners have a right to all oil or gas beneath their land. Instead, it merely
imposes a duty on operators to take reasonable precautions against excess drainage. See
Comment, supra note 37, at 141-42.
46. The function of tort law is to compensate an injured party "for the damage he
has suffered, at the expense of the wrongdoer." W. PROSSER, supra note 44, § 2, at 7. A
number of different tort theories have evolved in order to accomplish this task. Each
theory has not only different elements that must be satisfied before liability attaches but
also a different measure of damages. This is clearly illustrated by the difference be-
tween damages for negligent conduct and damages for intentional trespass. In actions
based on negligent trespass, plaintiff is compensated only for actual damage incurred.
In actions based on intentional trespass, however, plaintiff may be awarded punitive
damages and even compensatory damages despite the absence of actual damage. Id. at
1-4, 10-11.
In secondary recovery cases the court can easily distort the purpose of tort law by
applying the wrong theory of liability. For example, in actions based on conversion,
damages are generally measured by the full value of the goods or chattels taken with
no deduction for expenses incurred by the defendant. Id. at 96-97. See, e.g., Pan Amer-
ican Petroleum Corp. v. Candelaria, 403 F.2d 351, 355-56 (10th Cir. 1968); Baumgart-
ner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 184 Neb. 384, 389-90, 168 N.W.2d 510, 514 (1969). See also
1 Sut.nas § 24. Although this measure of damages may be equitable in most trespass
and conversion situations, it is ineffective in secondary recovery cases. The amount of
drainage from beneath a certain tract of land is often not the true measure of damage
suffered by the owner. Using the traditional computation of damages for conversion,
a plaintiff may recover the market value of the oil drained from beneath his land, even
though the adjacent pressurizing operation actually increases the recovery of oil through
his own wells. The amount of recoverable oil beneath a tract varies with the direction
and level of pressure exerted on the oil. The adjacent secondary operation may drain
some oil, but it may also pressure more of the remaining oil towards plaintiff's wells.
See Lynch, supra note 37, at 74-79; see, e.g., Reed v. Texas Co., 22 Ill. App. 2d 131,
138-39, 159 N.E.2d 641, 645 (1959); Carter Oil Co. v. Dees, 340 Il. App. 449, 459,
92 N.E.2d 519, 524 (1950). A theory of liability must be coupled with a system which
properly measures the amount of damage actually sustained.
Young illustrates a situation in which the use of the trespass or conversion measure
of damages does not accurately reflect the actual damages sustained. The plaintiff had
a large amount of valuable brine taken from beneath his land and asked for damages
in the amount of $9,000,000 to cover the value of the minerals taken. 382 F. Supp.
at 772. See also Brief for Appellant at 1, 25-30, Young v. Ethyl Corp., 521 F.2d 771
(8th Cir. 1975). This figure is a totally inaccurate reflection of plaintiff's actual dam-
ages. Had plaintiff undertaken primary or secondary recovery operations on his own
land, he could not have recovered a profitable amount. Id. at 17-18, so that an award
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the result. 47  As the injection of pressurizing substances into mineral
reservoirs becomes more frequent, the issue of subsurface trespass may
become a significant legal problem. Only a well-reasoned analysis
distinguishing trespass, intentional taking, strict liability, private nui-
sance, negligence, and abuse of "correlative rights" will lead to con-
sistent, just results.48
The Young decision could affect oil and gas producers as well as salt-
water recovery operations. Although the court did not explicitly hold
that trespass applied to the secondary recovery of gas and oil, it did
clearly disapprove of the rule of capture if used to protect forced migra-
tion of nonfugacious minerals. 49  Since oil and gas are primarily non-
fugacious at the secondary recovery stage, Young may persuade other
courts to discard the rule of capture when dealing with secondary re-
covery in favor of liability based on trespass. If so, landowners would
be dissuaded from leasing mineral rights or participating in joint ven-
tures in the hope of receiving large damage awards; oil and gas producers
would face increased litigation. At a time when society requires effi-
fient gas and oil recovery techniques, this would be a significant problem.
A negligence theory of liability would least hinder resource recovery
while protecting the individual rights of landowners. The failure to
take reasonable precautions to prevent forseeable drainage would ex-
pose operators to liability for damages measured by the net value of the
resources thus extracted.50 The common law negligence standard best
balances the conflicting interests of the landowners and serves the in-
terests of society.
based on the product taken would be a windfall for plaintiff. Although the Eighth Cir-
cuit did not adjust the damages, it remanded the case to the district court after finding
liability under the theory of intentional trespass. 521 F.2d at 775. Were the district
court to fix damages by applying traditional damage measures, plaintiffs recovery would
far exceed the amount of his actual damages.
47. 521 F.2d at 774-75.
48. See notes 44-46 supra.
49. 521 F.2d at 774.
50. For a discussion of the negligence theory, see note 45 supra.
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